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sented with descriptions of social events and asked to attri-
bute the cause of the event either to a person, an object or a 
situation. Additionally, all subjects were tested for cognitive 
functioning levels.  Results: The schizophrenia patient group 
performed significantly worse on all social-cognitive tasks 
than the healthy control group. Correlation analysis showed 
that ego disturbances were related to deficits in person at-
tribution and lower levels of confidence in the source moni-
toring task. Also, ego disturbances were related to higher 
PANSS positive scores and a higher number of hospitaliza-
tions. Stepwise regression analysis revealed that social-cog-
nitive variables explained 48.0% of the variance in the ego-
disturbance score and represented the best predictors for 
ego disturbances. One particular clinical variable, namely 
the number of hospitalizations, additionally explained 13.8% 
of the variance.  Conclusion: Our findings suggest that ego 
disturbances are related to deficits in the social-cognitive 
domain, and, to a lesser extent, to clinical variables such as 
the number of hospitalizations. 
 Copyright © 2012 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 Throughout the last century, schizophrenia was tradi-
tionally referred to as an ego disorder by many psychia-
trists  [1–3] . This concept has been carried forward into 
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 Abstract 
 Background: Subjects experiencing ego disturbances can 
be classified as a distinct subgroup of schizophrenia pa-
tients. These symptoms imply a disturbance in the ego-
world boundary, which in turn implies aberrations in the 
perception, processing and understanding of social infor-
mation. This paper provides a comparison of a group of 
schizophrenia patients and a group of healthy controls on a 
range of social-cognitive tasks. Furthermore, it analyzes the 
relationship between ego disturbances and social-cognitive 
as well as clinical variables in the schizophrenia subsample. 
 Methods: Two groups – 40 schizophrenia patients and 39 
healthy subjects – were compared. In the source monitoring 
task, subjects performed simple computer mouse move-
ments and evaluated the partially manipulated visual feed-
back as either self- or other-generated. In a second step, par-
ticipants indicated the confidence of their decision on a 
4-point rating scale. In an emotion-recognition task, sub-
jects had to identify 6 basic emotions in the prosody of spo-
ken sentences. In the ‘reading-the-mind-in-the-eyes’ test, 
subjects had to infer mental states from pictures that de-
picted others’ eyes. In an attribution task, subjects were pre-
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modern psychopathology by defining individual symp-
toms of ego disturbances that occur in some patients. The 
most influential definition was provided by Schneider  [3, 
4] who termed these symptoms ‘first-rank symptoms’ be-
cause they were regarded as primary for the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. These included symptoms such as delu-
sional and sense deception phenomena; thought inser-
tion, withdrawal and broadcasting (and other forms of 
thought interference); feelings of being controlled by an 
external force; and everything in the spheres of feelings, 
drive and volition experienced as being imposed or influ-
enced by others  [4] . Concerning a common ground to 
these symptoms, Schneider  [3, 4] suggested grouping 
them under the concept of ‘permeability of the ego-world 
boundary’, i.e. a disturbance of the ability to maintain a 
clear distinction between the self and the environment.
 Regarding this permeability of the self, it can be as-
sumed that patients with ego disturbances are impaired 
in the domain of social cognition, the ability to build rep-
resentations about oneself and others, as well as about 
relations between oneself and others  [5, 6] . An intact ego-
world boundary is understood as a necessary condition 
for an adequate understanding of the subjective world of 
other people  [7, 8] . On the other hand, a lack of discrimi-
nation between self and other, such as the perception that 
thoughts and actions are externally controlled or manip-
ulated, might be associated with difficulties in correctly 
understanding social information.
 Until now, social cognition – which represents a mul-
tidimensional construct including various processes such 
as source monitoring, emotion recognition, mental state 
recognition (theory of mind) and social causal attribu-
tion  [5, 6] – has mainly been studied with regard to an 
influential hypothesis by Frith and Done  [9–11] . They as-
sumed that deficits in social cognition might be selec-
tively impaired in relation to certain symptoms of schizo-
phrenia. In line with this hypothesis, studies using differ-
ent mental state recognition paradigms, such as first- and 
second-order false-belief tasks, hinting tasks and decep-
tion or animated sequence tasks, have found impair-
ments in subjects with prominent behavioral or paranoid 
symptoms, but no impairments in patients with ego dis-
turbances  [11–15] . Only one study reported a worse per-
formance, which may be due to the small sample size  [16] .
 By contrast, source monitoring abilities have been 
shown to be selectively impaired in patients with ego dis-
turbances  [17–21] , with only a few studies showing con-
flicting results  [22–24] .
 Regarding social causal attribution, so far one study 
has investigated causal attribution in patients displaying 
ego disturbances, demonstrating a tendency to internally 
attribute, i.e. to blame oneself, for task-related events  [22] .
 Taken together, these results could be integrated into 
the classification of social-cognitive processes of Lieber-
man and colleagues  [25, 26] by speculating that ego dis-
turbances might be related to impairments in internal 
domains of social cognition, such as source monitoring 
or social causal attribution, which rely on reflective, men-
tal and emotional aspects of oneself and other individu-
als. By contrast, processes focusing on external, physical 
and visual characteristics of oneself and others, like men-
tal state recognition or emotion recognition, seem to be 
relatively intact.
 However, studies that systematically investigate a 
range of social-cognitive processes in relation to ego dis-
turbances are so far lacking. Therefore, the goal of our 
investigation was to explore this relationship in more de-
tail in a sample of schizophrenia patients and a control 
sample. The specific objectives of the study were to com-
pare the patient and the control sample on a variety of 
social-cognitive tasks encompassing source monitoring, 
emotion recognition, mental state recognition and social 
causal attribution, and to analyze the influence of social-
cognitive and clinical variables on ego disturbances. 
Based on previous research, we expected significant as-
sociations between source monitoring impairments, so-
cial causal attribution deficits and ego disturbances.
 Methods 
 Subjects 
 Schizophrenia Group 
 The schizophrenia group (SG) comprised 40 patients (28 men, 
12 women, mean age = 38.3 years, SD = 9.8) with an ICD-10 diag-
nosis of schizophrenia in full or partial remission (ICD-10 F20. 
 ! 4/ ! 5). Patients were recruited from the outpatient service of 
the Psychiatric University Hospital Zurich (n = 35) and the inpa-
tient ward of a teaching hospital of the University of Zurich, the 
‘Sanatorium Kilchberg’ (n = 5).
 Exclusion criteria for patients were: (1) a different main diag-
nosis than schizophrenia (F20.0–F20.3), (2) age under 20 or over 
60 years, (3) history of any brain injury or neurological illness, (4) 
vision reduction, (5) an axis II disorder (DSM-IV), (6) cognitive 
impairments, and (7) not fluent enough in the German language 
to follow instructions. Of the 40 patients, 33 were receiving anti-
psychotic medication: mean chlorpromazine equivalents (CPZe) 
were 410.8 (SD = 360.3); CPZe for second-generation antipsychot-
ics were calculated according to Woods [74]. Mean IQ, estimated 
by the raw Score on the Multiple Vocabulary Test B  [27] measur-
ing verbal-dependent intelligence was 109.0 (SD = 13.5). The aver-
age duration of illness was 15.4 years (SD = 19.8). All but two pa-
tients were right-handed  [28] . Clinical assessment was made by 
personal interview on the day of testing by two trained psycholo-
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gists using the German version of the Positive and Negative Syn-
drome Scale (PANSS)  [29] . Seventeen subjects met the criteria for 
the paranoid type of schizophrenia, two for the hebephrenic type 
and 21 for the undifferentiated type.
 All patients were clinically stable at the time of testing and 
gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which 
had been approved by the local ethics committee. Our study was 
conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration 
of Helsinki. Descriptive information for the patient and control 
groups is provided in  table 1 .
 Control Group 
 The control group (CG) comprised 39 healthy control subjects 
(22 men, 17 women, mean age = 34.46, SD = 9.7 years) recruited 
at the University of Zurich (n = 15), in adult education facilities 
(n = 19) and among hospital staff (n = 5). Exclusion criteria for the 
control subjects were: (1) history of any brain injury or neuro-
logical illness, (2) age under 20 or over 60 years, (3) cognitive im-
pairments, (4) history of habitual alcohol or drug abuse or current 
abuse, (5) vision reduction, (6) history of schizophrenia or related 
disorders, (7) current depression, and (8) not sufficiently fluent in 
the German language to follow the instructions. All control sub-
jects but one were right-handed  [28] and the main IQ score, esti-
mated by the score on the MWT-B  [27] , was 115.7 (SD = 24.5).
 Measures and Procedures 
 Ego Disturbances 
 We used the Ego-Disturbance Scale from the Working Group 
on Methodology and Documentation in Psychiatry (AMDP) for 
the assessment of ego disturbances in the SG  [30, 31] . The scale 
contains the following items: (1) thought broadcasting, (2) thought 
withdrawal, (3) thought insertion, (4) derealization, (5) deperson-
alization, and (6) other symptoms of alien control, following a 
proposal of Loftus et al.  [32] . Each item was scored from 0 to 3 
(0 = nonexistent, 1 = mild, 2 = medium, 3 = heavy), for a maxi-
mum score of 18 in total.
 The Source Monitoring Task 
 Source monitoring was investigated by means of an estab-
lished source monitoring task  [33, 34] . Participants performed 
simple right-handed mouse movements towards a white target 
object (an asterisk) appearing either on the upper left or the right 
side of a black computer screen. Movements could be tracked vi-
sually in the form of a cursor displayed on the screen. The cursor 
Table 1.  Sociodemographic variables of the sample
S chizophrenia group (n = 40) Control group (n = 39) Statistics p
mean SD MD  mean SD MD
Sociodemographic variables
Sex (male:female) 28:12 22:17 2 = 1.5 n.s.
Age, years 38.5 9.8 34.4 9.7 F (1,77) = 3.1 n.s.
IQ 109 13.5 115.7 24.5 F (1,77) = 2.2 n.s.
Han dedness (right:left)1 89.9 40.5 100 88.0 34.4 100 U = 760 n.s.
Education, years 12.5 1.7 13 13.9 2.1 13 U = 503.5 <0.01
Illness-related variables
Duration of illness, years 15.4 19.8
Number of hospitalizations 3.3 4.3
PANSS positive 15.8 3.3
PANSS negative 22.3 7.2
PANSS general 29.3 5.1
PANSS overall 67.6 13.2
Mean antipsychotic dose, CPZe 410.8 360.3       
Social-cognitive variables
Source monitoring task
Sensitivity index 73 6.7 79.8 10.4 F (1,77) = 4.9 <0.05
Certainty rating 1.4 0.3 1.4 0.3 F (1,77) = 0.0 n.s.
Emotion recognition in prosody 8.1 8.5 8.5 8.9 1.4 8.5 U = 569.5 <0.05
Reading the mind in the eyes 23.1 3.1 25.5 2.6 F (1,77) = 12.9 <0.01
Attribution task
Incorrect person attribution 5.7 5.4 3.2 2.7 F (1,77) = 12.8 <0.01
Incorrect object attribution 9.5 4.0 7.0 3.5 F (1,77) = 8.3 <0.05
Incorrect situational attribution 3.6 2.6  2.4 2.0  F (1,77) = 4.2 <0.05
MD = Mean deviation. 1 Raw score, not standardized.
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movement matched the subjects’ executed movements only in 
50% of the trials (real feedback, RF). In the other 50%, a random-
ly selected movement from a previous trial of the participant was 
replayed (false feedback, FF). To avoid systematic differences be-
tween RF and FF, false movements always went in the same direc-
tion as the subject’s intended movements, but they could differ in 
regard to onset, speed and path deviations. As a cover story, par-
ticipants were told that on some trials they would see the experi-
menter’s movements who performed the task in the adjacent 
room, instead of their own movements (see  fig. 1 for a graphic de-
piction of the task).
 Subjects were told to monitor the movements carefully and to 
indicate after each trial whether they were the agent of the ob-
served movement (self) or not (other) by pressing the correspond-
ing button (for more details on the source monitoring task see 
David et al.  [33, 34] ). The task thus yielded a quasi 2  ! 2 design 
with the first factor feedback (real vs. false) and the second factor 
evaluation (self vs. other). In a second judgment, participants in-
dicated their confidence in their decision on a 4-point rating scale 
(1 = certain, 2 = rather certain, 3 = rather uncertain, 4 = uncer-
tain). (The second scale was included as an additional rating to 
assess the confidence with which the evaluation of self or other 
was made.)
 The task was conducted on a DELL Optiplex 755 computer 
(1,680  ! 1,050 resolution), employing the Presentation software 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, Calif., USA). Each participant 
read standardized written instruction before the test started, fol-
lowed by 20 practice trials to become used to the task procedure. 
The task consisted of a total of 200 trials, of which 100 were RF 
and 100 were FF (50 trials to the left and 50 trials to the right tar-
get). It was carried out in 3 short runs of approximately 8 min.
 The Emotion-Recognition Task 
 The emotion-recognition task was designed by Edwards et al. 
 [35] and demanded the identification of 6 basic emotions by 
means of spoken sentences: sadness, anger, happiness, disgust, 
surprise and fear. The content of the sentences was neutral and 
consisted of simple statements, for example: ‘She will drive fast’. 
To test the ability of the subjects to understand general prosodic 
cues, a control task was used consisting of two questions and two 
declarative sentences that had to be correctly identified before 
starting the test. The main test was composed of 12 sentences. 
Each emotion appeared two times. Including the 4 control sen-
tences, the task contained 16 trials. Response categories were cod-
ed as 0 = incorrect and 1 = correct.
 The ‘Reading-the-Mind-in-the-Eyes’ Task 
 The ‘reading-the-mind-in-the-eyes’ task  [36] is aimed at as-
sessing mental state recognition abilities. The test consisted of 36 
pictures showing expressive pairs of male or female eyes. Each 
picture was presented with 4 choices of adjectives. Subjects were 
asked to choose the adjective that best describes the mental state 
of the person (i.e. as expressed by his/her eyes). A global accuracy 
score according to Baron-Cohen et al.  [36] ranging from 0 to 36 
was computed.
 The Attribution Task 
 The attribution task used in our study is based on the attribu-
tion theory of Kelley and Levine [37] and was designed by Rössler 
and Lackus  [38] . Kelley and Levine [37] proposed that each action, 
behavior or event can be attributed to three categories of causes: 
the person that performs an action, the object the action is di-
rected to, or the circumstances or situation in which the action 
takes place. While person and object categories can be under-
stood as relatively stable categories, attributing a cause to the cir-
cumstances of a situation is more of an unstable and transient 
causal category. Kelley and Levine  [37] assumed that in order to 
make the correct attribution, the observer analyzes all available 
information in terms of three categories, namely consensus, dis-
tinctiveness and consistency. Using ‘Susie is afraid of the dog’ as 
an example:
 Consensus (across persons) : is high if several other people are 
afraid of the dog and low if nobody else is afraid of the dog. In the 
case of low consensus, the observer would attribute the fear to 
Susie’s character as a stable disposition.
 Distinctiveness (over entities) : is high if Susie is only afraid of 
this dog and low if Susie is afraid of all dogs. In the case of high 
distinctiveness, the observer would conclude that this dog is re-
sponsible for Susie’s fear.
 Consistency (over time) : is high if Susie is always afraid of the 
dog and low if Susie is afraid of the dog only once. In the case of 
low consistency, the observer would conclude that situational cir-
cumstances are responsible Susie’s fear.
 In our setup, the participants were presented with depictions 
of 18 written social events on a computer screen. Each description 
of an event was presented three times, in each case with changing 
Agency
rating
self-other
Confidence
rating
Tim
e
 Fig. 1. Source monitoring task and design. Subjects saw the aster-
isk which appeared either on the left or right side of the screen, 
they had to move the mouse towards the asterisk. After hitting the 
asterisk, subjects had to evaluate whether the visual feedback had 
matched their executed movement or not and how confident they 
were of their judgment. 
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additional information regarding the consensus, distinctiveness 
and consistency of the event, for example: Susie is afraid of the 
dog, (1) nobody else is afraid of this dog (low consensus); (2) Susie 
is not afraid of other dogs (high distinctiveness); (3) usually Susie 
is not afraid of this dog (low consistency). Each description indi-
cated a specific causal attribution (person, object and situation) 
according to the theory of Kelley and Levine  [37] . To eliminate 
interfering variables, none of the depictions of social events con-
tained references to emotional states. A person attribution error 
was classified if participants made false person attributions in 
cases where demanded object or situational attributions were 
called for. Similarly, object and situational errors were classified 
if participants did not choose the appropriate attribution.
 Statistical Analysis 
 Data were analyzed using SPSS version 19 software for Win-
dows (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Ill., USA). The normal distribution of 
data was verified by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Analyses of 
significant differences between the study groups were calculated 
by applying a one-way ANOVA, given that the normality assump-
tion was met. Non-normally distributed variables were analyzed 
using the Mann-Whitney U test. The   2 test was used to analyze 
possible age differences between groups.
 In a first step, ANOVAs were used to determine whether there 
were significant differences in sociodemographic variables and in 
the social-cognitive task performance between the CG and the 
SG. As dependent variables for the source monitoring task, we 
used (1) the sensitivity index (number of correct trials – number 
of incorrect trials) and (2) the degree of confidence of the self-
other evaluation, which was calculated as a new variable; the 
mean confidence score (the sum of all four ratings divided by the 
total number of ratings, resulting in a number between 1 and 4). 
As dependent variables for the emotion recognition task, the 
number of correctly identified general prosodic cues in the con-
trol task and of correctly identified emotions in the main task 
were used. For the mental state recognition task the number of 
correctly identified mental states was used as dependent variable. 
For the attribution test, false person, object and situational attri-
butions were used as dependent variables.
 Bivariate Pearson and Spearman correlations between ego dis-
turbances and social-cognitive and clinical variables were calcu-
lated. In a second step, a stepwise regression analysis was used to 
model if the degree of ego disturbance in the SG could be pre-
dicted by social-cognitive functioning and clinical variables. A 
positive correlation between ego disturbances and the PANSS 
positive scale was found, which represents an overlap between the 
concepts of ego disorder and positive symptoms. Therefore the 
PANSS positive scale was excluded as an explaining variable from 
the regression analysis. Levels of significance were set at p  ! 0.05.
 Results 
 Comparison between the SG and the CG 
 Descriptions of the two samples regarding sociodemo-
graphic data, clinical data and results of the social cogni-
tive tasks are shown in  table 1 . SG and CG differed sig-
nificantly in education (U = 503.5, p  ! 0.01) and in all 
social cognitive tasks (all F  1 3.6, all p  ! 0.05), with the 
SG being less educated and performing worse on all ap-
plied social cognitive tasks. The only measure that was 
not different was the confidence rating in the source 
monitoring task, where the SG showed the same amount 
of confidence in their self-other evaluation as the CG 
(F = 0.0, p  1 0.05).
 Correlation Analysis between Ego Disturbances and 
Social-Cognitive and Clinical Measures 
 To evaluate the relationship between ego disturbances 
and social-cognitive, socio-demographic and clinical 
variables, correlation analyses were performed ( table 2 ). 
From the social-cognitive variables, the ego-disturbance 
score was significantly correlated with the confidence 
rating of the source monitoring task. With respect to 
clinical variables, correlations were found with the num-
ber of hospitalizations and with the PANSS positive score.
 Regression Analysis between Ego Disturbances and 
Social Cognitive and Clinical Measures 
 Table 3 shows the hierarchical regression analysis for 
ego disturbances. The results of the analysis show that a 
higher number of person attribution errors (  = 0.61, p  ! 
Table 2.  Relationship between social-cognitive and clinical vari-
ables and the ego disturbance score
Pearson’s r p
Sociodemographic variables
Age 0.287 n.s.
IQ –0.038 n.s.
Education –0.027 n.s.
Illness-related variables
Duration of illness 0.020 n.s.
Number of hospitalizations 0.348 <0.05
PANSS positive 0.491 <0.001
PANSS negative 0.144 n.s.
PANSS general 0.223 n.s.
Mean antipsychotic dose, CPZe –0.094 n.s.
Social-cognitive variables
Source monitoring task
Sensitivity index 0.208 n.s.
Certainty rating 0.343 <0.05
Emotion recognition in prosody 0.091 n.s.
Reading the mind in the eyes 0.117 n.s.
Attribution task
Incorrect person attribution 0.345 <0.05
Incorrect object attribution 0.260 n.s.
Incorrect situational attribution 0.129 n.s.
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0.05), elevated levels of confidence in the self-other rating 
(  = 0.51, p  ! 0.01) and a higher number of hospitaliza-
tions (  = 0.38, p  ! 0.01) were significant predictors for 
the presence of ego disturbances. The three independent 
variables accounted for 61.8% of the variance in ego dis-
turbances (F = 16.0, p  ! 0.01).
 Discussion 
 The present study compared four domains of social 
cognition in a sample of schizophrenia patients and a 
sample of healthy controls and, in a second step, analyzed 
the relationship between social-cognitive and clinical 
variables and the presence of ego disturbances.
 In line with previous research, we found that schizo-
phrenia patients had deficits in all four examined do-
mains of social cognition  [39–43] . According to our hy-
pothesis, the performance in the social-cognitive tests 
explained almost half of the variance of the ego distur-
bance score. Within the social-cognitive battery, inter-
nally oriented social-cognitive domains – such as social 
causal attribution or the metacognitive confidence judg-
ment in the source monitoring task – were predictive of 
ego disturbances, whereas externally oriented process-
es – such as basic emotion recognition or mental state 
recognition – were not predictive variables. The number 
of hospitalizations also had a predictive effect. Contrary 
to our hypothesis, no association was found between the 
self-other evaluation in the source monitoring task and 
ego disturbances.
 So far, in line with our results, a number of studies 
have demonstrated significant deficits in all investigated 
domains of social cognition with a clear impact on func-
tional outcome and implications for treatment guidelines 
[for review articles, see  41, 44–46 ].
 Regarding the specific deficits in relation to ego dis-
turbances, different factors have been discussed  [47–49] . 
It has been suggested that abnormalities – such as tempo-
ral lobe pathology  [49] , abnormal activity in the parietal 
lobe  [50, 51] , alterations in associative higher-order neu-
ronal circuits such as the mirror-neuron system  [47, 52] , 
reduced cerebral asymmetry  [53] or time perception def-
icits  [54] – might be relevant factors associated with ego 
disturbances. Regarding social-cognitive processes, only 
source monitoring deficits, important in securing self-
other differentiation, have been discussed as central to 
the formation of ego disturbances  [17, 51, 55] . Our results 
suggest that deficits in other internally focused social-
cognitive processes, like social causal attribution, could 
be similarly important factors.
 Social causal attribution in general must be under-
stood as a process encompassing internally and external-
ly oriented aspects of social cognition since causes of 
events can be attributed to persons or to external factors 
like objects or situations. In line with this differentiation, 
neuroimaging evidence shows that person attribution is 
associated with activation of brain areas related to inter-
nally oriented activity  [56] . In a more concrete sense, an 
internalizing attribution style characterized by a high 
number of person attribution errors means that a subject 
is considered responsible for an event, not an object or a 
situation. Rössler and Lackus  [38] point out that a prefer-
ence for stable (person or object) over unstable categories 
(situation) can be understood as an attempt to gain con-
trol and make the outside world more predictable. Situa-
tion attributions are complex and imply little prognostic 
value for future events. Person attributions, by contrast, 
are easier und allow forecasts of the behavior of people in 
future situations. Our study results suggest that an in-
flexible attribution style with an overemphasis on person 
attribution might be a risk factor for the emergence of ego 
disturbances  [57] . In line with our results, a study by 
Fourneret et al.  [22] using a source monitoring task shows 
that patients with ego disturbances were unable to attri-
bute the differences between visual information and mo-
tor information externally to the computer, but attributed 
them to internal factors such as tiredness, lack of concen-
tration or effects of the disease. Symptoms of ego distur-
Table 3.  Linear regression analysis (stepwise) with the ego distur-
bance score as the dependent variable
corr
R2
F p
Model 1 0.171 6.764 (1, 27) <0.050
Model 2 0.480 13.900 (2, 26) <0.000
Model 3 0.618 16.083 (3, 25) <0.000
 t p
Model 1
Incorrect person attributions 0.448 2.601 <0.05
Model 2
Incorrect person attributions 0.609 4.296 <0.000
Certainty rating 0.585 4.126 <0.000
Model 3
Incorrect person attributions 0.610 5.019 <0.000
Certainty rating 0.518 4.202 <0.000
Number of hospitalizations 0.383 3.225 <0.000
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bances in general are associated with a great loss of con-
trol over the self and self-experience. Attributing causes 
of events to a person might be an attempt to restore con-
trol. The negative effect of this strategy is, however, the 
creation of fear and isolation, since events cannot be ad-
equately understood and judged. In line with this idea, 
Mizrahi et al.  [43] show that a high level of person attri-
butions is associated with more psychopathology and less 
response to treatment. In this regard, it would be interest-
ing for a future study to use attribution tasks investigat-
ing real-life attribution patterns derived from patients’ 
narratives, such as reported in a study by Aakre et al.  [42] , 
to more closely understand the nature of attribution def-
icits in this patient group.
 Regarding the source monitoring task, contrary to 
our hypothesis we did not find an association between 
these performance deficits and ego disturbances. Several 
factors could account for this negative finding. First, our 
source monitoring paradigm might not have been subtle 
and complex enough to detect specific deficits in patients 
with ego disturbances. In other studies, paradigms with 
several experimental conditions were used. For example 
Daprati et al.  [18] used a paradigm with three experi-
mental conditions and found differences only in the 
most complex condition, where subject and experiment-
er had to perform exactly the same movement. By con-
trast, in our task the subjects could use temporal as well 
as spatial cues to evaluate movements as self- or other-
generated. Secondly, it is possible that mild ego distur-
bances are not related to deficits in action monitoring, 
but to a lower level of confidence in one’s own perfor-
mance. So far, several studies have shown that patients 
with schizophrenia exhibit deficits in metacognition, i.e. 
the judgment of one’s own performance in a test  [58, 59] . 
However, the relationship between metacognition and 
ego disturbances has not yet been investigated. Morrison 
and Haddock  [60] found no relationship between symp-
toms of hallucinations and metacognition. Moritz and 
Woodward  [61] found a positive relationship between 
symptoms of delusions and hallucinations and elevated 
levels of confidence in a word learning task; however, 
passivity experiences were not included either. Reduced 
levels of confidence in one’s own performance have been 
demonstrated for other psychiatric disorders like depres-
sion  [62, 63] and obsessive-compulsive disorder  [64, 65] , 
leading to specific symptoms like rumination or check-
ing, respectively. Regarding schizophrenia, more studies 
including patients with moderate-to-severe symptoms of 
ego disturbances are needed to investigate whether ego 
disturbances are associated with lower confidence in all 
performance tasks or only in source monitoring tasks, 
and whether patients with stronger symptoms, by con-
trast, show higher levels of confidence as suggested in the 
study by Moritz and Woodward  [61] .
 The third significant predictor in our study is the 
number of hospitalizations. Previous studies have estab-
lished hospitalization as a predictor for several negative 
outcomes such as a higher risk for suicide  [66] , relapse  [67, 
68] , switching antipsychotics  [69] , the experience of crit-
icism and hostility from relatives  [70] , and a more severe 
course of illness and lower social functioning  [71] . In our 
study, it was the only clinical variable predicting ego dis-
turbances. One interpretation could be that a higher 
number of positive symptoms, especially symptoms of 
ego disturbances, involve an increased risk of being hos-
pitalized, as research suggests  [72] . However, more stud-
ies are needed to validate our findings.
 Lastly, in the recognition of emotions and the percep-
tion of mental states, no specific impairments in relation 
to first-rank symptoms were detected. These findings 
support our hypothesis that ego disturbances per se do 
not seem to interfere with externally oriented domains of 
social cognition.
 Finally, some methodological points deserve consider-
ation. First, as mentioned above, the patients with ego 
disturbances were only mildly symptomatic at the time 
of testing and encompassed only 12 out of 40 patients. 
Therefore, our results have to be interpreted with caution 
and should be replicated in larger samples.
 Second, it is possible that the results are explainable by 
the fact that the patients with ego disturbances were more 
severely ill than the other patients as suggested by the cor-
relation of the ego disturbances score with the PANSS 
positive score and with the number of hospitalizations. 
However, and arguing against this explanation, we did 
not find a correlation of the ego-disturbance score with 
any other clinical variables. The high correlation between 
the PANSS positive score and the ego-disturbance score 
suggests rather that by applying the AMDP scale our con-
cept of ego disturbances might have been too narrow. 
Only passivity items and two items associated with delu-
sions (derealization, depersonalization) were included. 
Sense deception items like hallucinations and other delu-
sional items like grandiosity were not included, as sug-
gested by other instruments such as the SAPS scale or 
the ICD-10 criteria. The correlation between the PANSS 
positive scale and the AMDP scale shows that ego dis-
turbances should be investigated with instruments 
encompassing all three types of phenomena: passivity 
symptoms, sense deception symptoms and delusional 
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phenomena, as described by previous studies  [22, 53, 54, 
73] . Additionally, ego disturbances were not associated 
with a higher PANSS negative or PANSS general scores, 
suggesting that the patient group with ego disturbances 
was not more severely ill.
 To sum up, a high number of person attributions,
a lower confidence in own performance in the source 
monitoring task and a higher number of hospitalizations 
were the main predictors for ego disturbances. The def-
icits were mainly found in the sphere of internally fo-
cused processes, following an important classification of 
Lieberman and colleagues  [25, 26] . Our findings have 
clear implications for clinical practice. Cognitive and be-
havioral interventions that specifically target patients’ at-
tribution styles and their confidence regarding their abil-
ity in self-other differentiation may help to treat the 
symptoms of individuals suffering from ego disturbanc-
es. Our results also suggest that the impact of this symp-
tomatology should not be only studied in the area of neu-
robiology and motor cognition, but also in the area of 
social cognition, where heterogeneity considering specif-
ic deficits in the schizophrenia spectrum disorder has 
been shown.
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